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ABSTRACT 
Using Gramsci's notion of hegemony this paper analyses the nature, func ti ons and 
wide-ranging implications of the U.S. media 's coverage of Islam as represented by 
U.S. daily newspapers the New York Times and the Washington Times. Over the 
past two decades, the media coverage of Islam in these two newspapers has been 
unduly focused on negative portrayals of Islam and Is lamic Revivalism and has 
produced a decontextualised picture of fringe extremist movements that have arisen 
in some Islamic nations. There is an operation of hegemonic ideas regarding Islam in 
which hegemony works to limit the frames of reference, and subsequently, the space 
for discourse regarding Islam within the public sphere. The ideas that the uninformed 
public are being socialized into regarding Islam are those that benefit the 
governmental elites in maintaining support for U.S. foreign policy on Islamic 
nations. 
*This paper was initially researched and written in 2002, and in the context of the 
continuing media attention on Is/am borne out of the "War on Terror ". is in the 
process of being updated. 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Over the past two decades, the U.S. news media's coverage of Is lam as a politica l 
and religious force has grown steadily. The nature of the coverage, however, is at 
best unsympathetic, and at worst derogatory. In order to understand the hegemonic 
domination of the monolithic view of Islam as represented by the U.S. media as 
being reflective of dominant ideologies within the country, we must first understand 
hegemony. The Itali an Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci formulated the concept of 
hegemony in response to the power he saw the dominant economic classes of society 
holding. It can be defined as a situation where: 
Dominant groups in society, including fundamentally but not exc lusively the ruling 
class, mainta in their dominance by securing the "spontaneous consent" of 
subordinate groups, including the working class, through the negotiated construction 
of a political and ideological consensus which incorporates both dominant and 
dominated groups (Strinati, 1995: 165) 
Hegemony in a society is the political , moral and intellectual authority or leadership 
of a particular c lass over all others. The authority exerted by the ruling class under 
hegemonic control is not enforced through coerc ion, but flows fro m political and 
intellectual, leadership. Individuals under hegemonic control are manipulated into 
believing and internali sing the ideologies of the political and economic elite. Under 
hegemonic subordination, the members of a society are unknowingly socialised into 
a belief system that benefits those who are powerful within that society, and is 
symboli c of that society (Gitlin, 1980:253). Hegemony works to the detriment of the 
non-ruling classes within a society as their members internali ze ruling class values to 
their own di sadvantage by negating their own values. While subsuming culture, core 
hegemonic va lues become the nucleus of culture by margi nali zing values that are not 
consonant with the dominant ideology. What begins as economic and po litica l 
hegemony soon evolves into cultural hegemony, i.e. the shaping of cultural va lues 
and discourse within a soc iety in a manner such that onl y certain frames o f reference 
are left open for debate, and only certain realities are presented. 
Hegemony does not rely on propaganda in order to brainwash a nation into political 
or cultural consensus. Rather, it relies on the major institutions o f civil society such 
as education, the family, religion, mass media, popular culture, etc to di sseminate 
dominant values (S trinati, 1995: 168-169). In hi s Prison Notebooks, Gramsci notes 
that hegemony operates through the creation of a "false consciousness" through these 
institutions, by which the subordinate class believes the ideo logy and interests of the 
ruling class to be its own. According to Gramsci, hegemony is perpetuated by the 
middle class inte llectuals in a soc iety, who unconsciously undertake the task of 
organising and passing on the dominant values. By the very nature of capitali sm, a 
division o f labo ur occurs between all members of a soc iety. Gramsci states that 
although all tasks within society require some amount of intelligence and creativ ity, 
there are some "overtl y intell ectual tasks" which middle c lass intellectual s wi ll be 
call ed upon to perform (Ransome, 1992: 198). These tasks are primaril y related to the 
"more general administrative and organisational institutions which synchronise the 
ESS Working Paper 03 
Islam in American Media (1980-2001) 
activit ies of the economy with those of soc iety as a who le" (Ransome 1992: 198). In 
the modern world, one of these major institutions of middle c lass intell ectual 
influence is the media. 
The consent from subordinate c lasses must be constantl y won and re-won, because 
subordinate classes are often remi nded of their di sadvantageous pos ition in soc iety 
and must be re-mani pulated into subord inatation. ill the U. S., the media has a prized 
spot in the cultura l and political life of the nati on. As Gitlin has noted, peopl e look to 
the media for their realities, their heroes and their symbo ls ( 1980: I). As all 
commun ications and text within the society is open to the media, it is an ideal site fo r 
consent to be created and implemented, for the "production, reproduction and 
transformation of hegemony" (Stri nati , 1995: 168) . Media has the power to present 
and implement certain representations of the world that become rea lity fo r its 
consumers, who trust it to present them with all the relevant informati on that they 
require in order to make choices regarding their world . The noti on of obj ectivity that 
is attributed to the media in a democratic po liti ca l system allows and gives it the 
legitimacy to perpetuate ideologies and perceptions that are either deliberately 
(propaganda) or unconsciously (hegemony) supporti ve of rul ing interests. Gans 
quotes Phillip Sches linger as saying: 
"News is information which is transmi tted from sources to audiences, with 
journalists - who are members of bureaucrati c commercia l organisa ti ons and 
members of the profession - summari sing, refi ning and alteri ng what becomes 
available in order to make the information sui table for their audience." (Gans, 
1980:80) 
Thus, the media shapes news with the goal of re-enforcing pre-ex isting hegemonic 
ideals. This process is not an intentional one, as the journali sts themse lves are under 
hegemonic domination and unaware that they are presenting skewed views of reali ty. 
Yet their presentation of limited fra mes of infonnati on causes the publ ic to beli eve 
these frames to be the enti re story, Di scourse is thus limi tied onl y to the presented 
frames and conflicts in the news are "played out within a fi e ld of terms and premises 
that which does not overstep the hegemonic boundari es" (G itlin, 1980: 263). 
The media can be considered a site o f struggle between hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic (representi ng idea ls that are opposed to dominant ideo logy) movements 
in a society. However, counter-hegemonic movements are subject to 
misrepresentation in strategic eff0l1s to mai nta in ruling ideo logy. Thi s is because the 
media must "honor the po litica l-economic system, as [its] very power and presti ge 
presuppose that system" (Gitlin, 1980:263). 
Using Gramsci's not ion of hegemony this paper analyses the nature, functi ons and 
wide-ranging imp lications of the U.S. media's coverage o f Islam as represented by 
U.S. dai ly newspapers the New York T imes and the Washington Ti mes. Over the 
past two decades, the media coverage o f Islam in these two newspapers has been 
unduly focused on negative portraya ls of Is lam and Islamic Reviva li sm and has 
produced a decontex tuali sed picture of fringe ex tremi st movements that have ari sen 
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in some Islamic nations. There is an operation of hegemonic ideas regarding Islam in 
which hegemony works to limit the frames of reference, and subsequently, the space 
for discourse regarding Islam within the public sphere. The ideas that the uninformed 
public are being social ized into regarding Islam are those that benefit the 
governmental elites in maintaining support for U.S. foreign po li cy on Islamic 
nations. 
II. CRITICAL REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND FORMATION 
OF IDEAL TYPES 
Over the past two decades there has been a ri se in the amount of coverage devoted to 
Islam and Islamic " fundamentali sm" in the U.S. mainstream media, especially the 
print media. One of the major reasons for thi s is cited as the ri se in Islamic 
"ex tremism" or " fundamentalism" that manifests itself thro ugh the ri se of religious 
leaders who are spearheading ' lslamist groups' across the world, as we ll as through 
violent acts of protest in many countries (Esposito, 1997:20). 
This so-ca lled rev ivali sm is the subj ect of much academic and journali stic writing, 
representing a vari ety of viewpoints on its causes and manifestations. These views 
run along a continuum of thought that ranges from conservative, anti -Islamic views 
through moderate, culturally relativist views to pro-Islamic , culturally theocrati c 
views. IdentifYing these di sparate di scourses is important, as differing view points 
increase our understanding of the complex social, cultural, hi stori cal, religious, 
geographical and political forces that intersect to define life in Muslim countries and 
give rise to the phenomenon of Islamic Revivalism. These attitudes and viewpoints, 
once identified into Ideal Types, can help to create a typology to analyse the media's 
representations of Islam. By elaborating the components of each type, we can use 
these types as shorthand constructs to denote certain prevalent patterns in the media. 
These patterns are not merely coincidental. The representation of parti cular Vlew 
points and absence of others are illustrative of media stereotyping . 
The Ideal Types of perspectives on Islam that thi s paper attempts to define according 
to their presence in the U.S. are divided into the fo llowing: Clash of Civilisations, 
Moderate Cultural, Anti-Imperiali st, Moderate Islamic and Mili tant Islanlic. Thi s 
paper uses the Ideal Types to analyse Islam-related media coverage over the past two 
decades. While we are not hypothesising that all these viewpoints will be present in 
the mainstream media under analysis, both their presence or absence speaks vo lumes 
about the nature of hegemonic values in American society regarding Islam. An even 
di stribution of view representation over the Moderate Cultural , Anti -Imperialist, 
Islamic Moderate or Militant Islamic Ideal Types, will demonstrate a non-monolithic 
representation of Islam or Muslims within the U. S. However, if the pervading 
framing lens for news falls into the Clash of Civilisations Ideal Type, it may be 
surmised that the general level of accurate and sympathetic representation is very 
low, given thi s type's propensity to view Muslims as the in ferior and confrontational 
"Other" . 
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Typifying existing thought in such manner can help draw connecti ons between the 
everyday world of the daily newspaper and the academic world of the scho lar, 
illuminating how these notions trans late into cultural practice and reality through the 
operation of cultura l hegemony. The roots behind the perpetuation of the " Islamic 
Other" status are important to understand, as they have far-reaching consequences 
for the American polity as well as Muslims the world over. 
Before we place the various school s of thought regarding Islam and politi cal 
Islamism into a typo logy, it is helpful to define pertinent terms. " Is lam" means: 
(I slam- , Islam), [Arab .,- submission to God], world religion founded by the Prophet 
Muahammad. The teml " Islamic" is the adjective that defines those who are 
followers of the above religion, or the "lands where Islam is the predominant 
religion . (Collins Dictionary, 198 1 :450) 
Although reductive and mis lead ing, the tenn "Western" or "the West" appears in 
much of the literature regarding [s lam, usually placing it in opposition to or 
comparison to Islam. In its common usage, the "West" means: "the western part of 
the world. Commonly, Europe or North America as distinguished from Asia" 
(Oxford English Dictionary, 2002). In Islamic d iscourse, the West is often used to 
refer to the parts of the world, espec ially Western Europe and No rth America, where 
a) Islam is not the predominant religion and b) secu lar govemments are in power. 
The tenn "Western" has been used to describe mores and people who are: "Of or 
pertaining to the Western or European countries or races as di stinguished fro m the 
Eastern or Oriental" (OED, 2002). The terms " Islamic" and "Western" are ex tremel y 
reductive as they do not allow for the diversity of thought and cu ltural practice that is 
present in both of the geographical and religious spheres that these words 
encompass. However, extant literature is replete with thi s dichotomy, and thi s paper 
takes recourse to these temlS for conven ience. 
The words "fundamentalism", "militant" and "extremist" are all laden with negative 
associations. They bring to mind a vision of a fanatic zea lot who is ready to die for 
Islam. The literal meaning of the word "fundamentali st" can mean one who ca ll s for 
a return to the foundational beliefs of a religion. In the U.S. fundamentali sm has been 
traditionall y negatively associated with a movement in 20th century Protestantism 
that recognised the literal interpretation of the Bible as the onl y guide for Christi an 
living in the face of Dalwinian evo lution, seculari sm, and the emergence of liberal 
theology (Columbia Encyclopaedia, 2002; Esposito, 1999:5). In the mainstream U.S . 
media climate over the past three decades, the word has been app li ed to anyone 
connected with Islam who supports the view that Islam should inform every aspect 
of socio-po li tical life, often through a theocratic government based on Islamic 
principles. It is difficult to find a defi nition of "fundamentali sm" that is not laden 
with stereotypes and presuppositions and so thi s paper uses the word "revivalism" , 
which is often referred to as " Is lamic resurgence". Thi s term refers to a movement 
present in some [slamic countri es at the personal , soc io-cultural and political level in 
favour of using Islamic precepts as a guide for communal li fe . 
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In the U.S. , there currently exist many constructions of Islanl as a religion . Any 
accurate di scourse that relates to Islam ' s religious, moral and political influence on 
its followers must stem from an awareness and understanding of the philosophy of 
Islam as a way of life and as a way of governance. This understandi ng must also 
embrace the fact that Islam is not followed in a uniform manner worldwide, and that 
cultural imperatives playa large part in how religion is adapted (Esposito, 1997:50). 
One must be wary of not imputing all motives to Islam when dealing with Islamic 
nations. The "Islamic world", like any other, is dynamic, complex and ever evolving. 
It cannot be simplified or treated as a monolith that can be placed in comparison 
alongside the "West". Even though many tangible differences ex ist between Islam 
and its practices in various nations and the mores of "the West", we cannot take 
these differences at face value without examining them or understanding where they 
stem from. 
In order to identify and compare the various discourses eX IstIng within the U.S. 
regarding Islam, thi s paper employs a Weberian typology of "Ideal Types". Lewis 
Coser defines an ideal type as: 
An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view 
and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, di screte, more or less present and 
occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to 
those one-sidedly emphasised view points into a uni tied analytical construct. 
( 1977:223 -224) 
The ideal types that we shall construe to meaningfully categorize media views range 
from Anti-Islamic to Pro-Islamic. These are: 
A. Clash of Civi li sations/Conservative View 
B. Moderate/Cultural View 
C. Anti-Imperialist View 
D. Islamic Moderate View 
E. Militant Islamic View 
A: Clash of Civilizations/Conservative View 
The phrase "Clash of Civi li zations" was coined by Samuel P. Huntington , a noted 
scholar at Harvard Uni versity and one of the prime proponents of thi s view, in an 
essay and a book that outlined thi s theory. Along with Bernard Lewis, a greatly 
respected scholar ofIslam and the Muslim world at Princeton University, Huntington 
popularised thi s theory, which has had a substantial impact on U.S. foreign and 
terrorism policy. 
The Clash of Civili sations view is based on the theory that Is lam and the West are 
two incompatible civilisations. Due to hi stori cal, cultural and ideo logical differences 
in the values between Islamic nations and the Western world, they will inevi tabl y be 
at odds with each other in destructive ways. This view is notab le for its monolithic 
and dichotomous analysis of both Islamic and Western nations. 
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In hi s influential essay "The Clash of C ivili zati ons", Huntington claims that a 
civilisation is " .. . the highest cu ltural grouping of people and the broadest level of 
cultural identity that people have short of that which di stingui shes humans from 
other species" and that civi lizational differences wi ll be the most pervasive sources 
of conflict between people in thi s era (2000:4). He notes that this conflict is 
exacerbated by a phenomenon of "civi li zation consciousness" in non-Western 
civili zations, such as Islam, that brings people with a common civ ili zati on together 
and sees them compete with other civi li zations for internationa l and economic pre-
eminence and the di ssemination of their own religious and moral beliefs (2000:3-8). 
One of the hallmarks of thi s ideology is to ci te hi stori cal conflict between Islamic 
civili sation and Westem civili sation as a basis for curren t and future inter-civili zation 
(read: Islamic-Western) conflict. In 'The Roots of Muslim Rage" Bernard Lewis 
similarl y argues: 
"This is no less than a clash of civili sations - the perhaps irrational but surely 
histori c reaction of an ancient ri val against our Judeo-Chri stian heritage, our secular 
present, and the worldwide expansion of both" (1990 :4711 0) . 
He contends that the historical humili ation o f the "Muslim" at the hands o f the West, 
has made the Mus lim angry, and emphas ises three particular areas: the " loss of 
domination in the world" (begitming with the ultimate demise of the Ottoman 
Empire), the invasion of Western ideas and cultural practices into Muslim countri es 
that undermined the traditional ways of li fe and enfranch ised non-Muslim minorities 
in these countries, and the gradua l loss of male dominance in Mus li m households 
due to emancipated women and insubordinate chi ldren ( 1990:47/3). Lewis c laims 
that Muslims feel "a growing sense of awareness, among the heirs of an old , proud 
and long dominant civili zation, of having been overtaken, overborne and 
ovelw helmed by those who they regarded as inferiors" (1990:47/9). Huntington 
agrees, saying: " Muslims fear and resent Western power, and the threat which thi s 
poses to their soc iety and their belie fs" (1996:2 13). Thus, much of the discord 
between these two ci vili zations is based on jealousy and fear, on Muslims ' part, of 
the modem political , social and tecimological prowess exhibited by the West. 
The Clash of Civili sations view emphasises the differences between so-ca ll ed 
Islamic and Westem culture that have historically led to confli ct. The mai n source of 
conflict between the two nations stems from a disagreement on the place of religion 
in politics. It is obvious from the title " the Islamic world" that the main reli gion of 
the nations that comprise thi s civilisation is Islam. For the Western world , the 
leading re li gion is Christi anity, especiall y in its Protestant fom1 (Hunti ngton, 
1996:70). Huntington claims that this is the " single most important characteristic of 
Westem civili sati on" (1996:70). From the predominance of Protestant Chri st ianity 
stems the deeply held belief in the Western world that there should be a separati on 
between Church and State, i.e. religion and government. Lewis argues that thi s 
separation was not required in Is lam , nor was it acceptable or welcome (1990:47/9) : 
" for traditional Muslims, reli gion and politics are one and the same" (1990: I 07/2) . 
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Islam, by its very nature as a theocrati c way of life is at odds with the West's 
cherished institutions such as democracy and plurali sm, which are regarded as the 
highest po int in man's evolutionary journey. Huntington puts it bluntly when he 
states that Islam is " inhospitable" to "Western liberal ideas", mainly secularism 
( 1996: 114). If the adoption of Western liberal ideas such as secularism, plurali sm 
and representati ve democracy in the manner employed by the West are hallmarks of 
modernity and enlightenment, then the Islamic world is lagging far behind . However, 
both Huntington and Lewis tend to analyse nations or parts of the world where Islam 
is the predominant reli gion as if they were a monolith , as opposed to di stinct and 
dynamic cultu res where the interpretation and practi ce of Islam varies greatly fro m 
one place to another and is constantl y changing. 
The Clash of Civili zations does not merely delineate differences between the West 
and Islam, but insists that these differences will continue to be exacerbated and 
expressed in violent ways, primarily in the form of an inter-civili zational war 
between Islam and the West (HlUltington, 1996: 21 6). This war is a direct result of 
the Islamic Resurgence, a "crusade" occurring within the Islamic world : "a revival of 
Islamic ideas, practices, rhetori c and the rededication to Islam by Musli m 
populations" and c laims that this is a mainstream movement (Huntington, 1996: II 0) 
What thi s perspecti ves lack is an understanding of Islami c culture and religion as 
di stinct fro m, but non-in feri or to, Western culture, and of the immense vari ety in 
Islamic practi ce within and among Muslim nations. Basing current understandings of 
Muslims on centuries old hi storical events and an ideologica l notion of civi li zational 
identi ty not only reduces a complex geo-political rea lity to a dichotomous 
framework, but also ignores the power of the nation state as both a symbol and 
rea li ty that forms the basis of identity. Huntington and Lewis seek hi stori ca l and 
religious explanations for largely geo-politica l and cultura l phenomena. They fail to 
note that causa l relat ionships between the various components of soc iety are much 
more complex than they appear. While exploring the de fi ciencies within the Islamic 
world in depth, Huntington and Lewis are content to conveniently ignore less than 
moral actions carried out by the West. 
B: Moderate/CulturalView 
All the available literature that views both Islanl and Islamic reviva li sm thro ugh a 
culturally relati vist lens fa ll into thi s category. This view takes a closer look at 
regions of the world where lslamism is on the ri se, and not draw simplistic, 
unchanging conclusions about why thi s phenomenon is occurring. Rather, it 
thoroughly and respectfull y explores the local circumstances and complex ities of 
Islamic Revivali sm and political unrest within Is lamic countri es before drawing 
conclusions on which foreign policy dec isions are made. Thi s view point holds that 
much of the " religiously based" violence emanating from Muslim nations in the fo rnl 
of rad ical fringe groups is o ften politicall y-based ideology ex pressed through the 
vocabulary of rel igion. The Moderate/Cultural view espouses foreign policy refornl 
that allows the U.S. to take a clearer view of the situation in the Midd le East, 
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unclouded by simplistic understandings of religion and its intersecti on with politics. 
It asks that prev ious po li cy be rep laced wi th a view that addresses the realities of 
spec ific threats that might ari se for the U.S. from instable political conditions in the 
Is lamic world. 
Islamic scholar John Esposito has commented: 
"Distinguishing between a relig ious or ideological alternative and a direct politica l 
threat requires walking the fine line between myth and real ity, between the un ity of 
Islam and the di versity of its multiple and complex manifestations in the world 
today, between the violent actions of the few and the aspirations of many. (1999:3)" 
Esposito argues that local ci rcumstances must playa majo r ro le in o ur understanding 
of Islamic reviva li sm, and of those who embrace it in its vio lent forms, such as 
through terrori st attacks. He notes that thi s resurgence has been demonstrated by a 
desire for an increase in Is lamica ll y oriented government organi sati ons, laws, banks, 
socia l we lfare services and educational systems, not mere ly violence, and that there 
are ollen non-religious reasons for the apparent ri se of Islami sm. 
Fouad Ajami , a Lebanese scho lar writing on Middle Eastern po li tics and Islamic 
revivalism notes that it is not civili sations, but states, who are the largest actors, and 
that the "phenomenon we have dubbed Islamic f-tllldamenta li sm is less a sign of 
resurgence than of panic and bewildennent and guilt that the border with ' the other' 
(the West) has been crossed (2000:64-65). He sees revivali sm as " tradition 
mongering" in order to appeal to the yo uth of di senfranchised Arab nations, and 
argues that the "Clash of Civili zations" hypothesis lacks complexity in 
acknowledging the seri ous political aspects of rev ivali sm. Ajami sees a large part of 
the militant Islamic resurgence groups among some nations such as Saud i Arabia as 
"xenophobia of a murderous ki nd ... dressed up in reli gious garb" and more a 
response to U.S. foreign po li cy and continued military presence than reli giously 
based fervour (200 1:55) 
Robin Wright, the Middle East correspondent for The Los Angeles Times, agrees, 
arguing that the so-call ed Islamic upri sings in many Islami c nations is " rage" 
directed against manipulation by foreign (espec ially co lonial) powers; occupation of 
Islamic territory by ali ens (Israel and the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia) ; the 
failure of some secular movements - from Baathist sociali sm to hereditary monarchy 
- to address foreign and domestic poli cy problems; pandemic corruption; and the 
absence o f institutions through which di scontent can be vo iced effecti vely. Wright 
makes the important case, ignored by Huntington and Lewis, that religious reviva ls 
are not always, or even ollen, religious ly moti vated. If this is the case, then the 
answers li e in fore ign policy refornl that does no create such hosti lity in the Middle 
East. 
This viewpoint argues for cultural and politica l spec ificity in pinpointing the cause of 
'religious ' upri sings within Islamic nations - the reasons are sometimes not very 
religious at all. A moderate/cu ltural approach to Islam asks us to be aware of all the 
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other complex factors that interact to create political and re li gious conflict in Islamic 
nati ons, and seri ously consider the possibility that these confli cts are o ften refl ecti ve 
o f U.S. foreign and local policy rather than internal reli gious di ssent. 
c: Anti-Imperialist View 
Those who are the proponents of thi s view present one o f the few voices critical of 
what they characteri se as the U.S. ' s imperi ali sti c actions in the Middle East and other 
parts of the world. [t is impossible to analyse politics and foreign poli cy in those 
regions without alluding to Islam, and the emergent rev ivali sm, though proponents of 
thi s view see reli gion as having very little to do with the current state of unrest in the 
Middle East's Islamic nati ons. This view is grounded in its criti cism o f the U.S. 's 
constant exacerbation of tension with Islamic nations by its unequivoca l support of 
Israel. It is also characterised by the notion that there ex ists an Orientali st bias w ithin 
the Ameri can media that colours its representation if Islamic nations in a negative 
manner and is connected to political imperi ali sm. 
For scholar Edward Said , imperiali sm has its roots in " Oriental ism". In the book of 
the same name, Said traces the hegemony o f negative portrayals of the Middle 
Eastelll Orient back to the colonial era. He comments that the Orient has aided the 
West in defining itself, even if only in opposition to the Orient. Said de fin es 
Ori ental ism as: "a di stribution of geopoliti cal awareness into aesthetic , scho larl y, 
economic, sociological , hi storical and philo logical texts" (Said , 1979: 12). It is not 
merely an elaboration of a geographical difference, but also a di fference in 
personality, experience, and inherent characteristics between the Orient (Islam) and 
the Occident (the West). It has within it the notion o f a superi or Westelll identity. 
This makes Oriental ism hegemonic both within the West and without it. Outside the 
West the hegemony ex ists in that all non-Western identities are inferior to those that 
are Westelll . Within the West, a hegemony of negati ve Western ideas about the 
Orient ex ists (Said , 1979: 7). These ideas about the Orient serve a dual purpose, they 
not onl y supported and justified the ideo logies of coloni ali sm in the past, they 
currently serve commercial and politica l imperi ali sm by the West (Said, 1979:39). 
Said speaks particul arly o f Islam . He advances the theory that Islam 's mighty 
hi stori ca l presence up until the 19th century proved to be a chall enge to Western 
Ori ental ism - "only the Arab and Islamic Orient presented Europe with an 
unresolved chall enge on the political, intellectual , and .. . economic leve ls" (Said, 
1979:74). However, after a period of global co lonial dominance, the West was still at 
odds with the Orient. The end of the Co ld War did nothing to ameliorate relati ons, 
and Islam continues to be represented with a set of Orienta li st cliches . [slam is 
spoken about with "an extreme level of non-specificity, and with scarcely a mention 
of the di fferences between individual Muslims, between Muslim soc ieti es, or 
between Muslim traditions and eras" (Said, 1979 :341 ). 
[t is using a vocabulary of generali sations that the media paints [slam as opposed to 
the values that are espoused by the U.S.: seculari sm, democracy, and freedom (Said, 
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1997:22). This representation is carri ed out with a seeming ignorance of the fact that 
most of the U.S.'s aIJi es in the Middle East have tradi tionall y been repressive 
regimes such as the ones in Saudi Arabia, lran (during the Shah 's rul e) and Egypt 
which ignore these selfsa me va lues to the U.S.'s complete indifference. The 
undemocratic acts and human rights abuses perpetrated by nations that are U.S. aIJi es 
are not di scussed, such as Israel's breach of international law and many U.N. 
Resolutions by its annexation of East Jerusa lem and the Golan Heights, as weIJ as its 
occupati on of South Lebanon since 1982 (Said, 1997:2 1). The U.S. medi a is adept at 
judging Islam, its followers and those who espouse a political life influenced by 
religion, by the standards of its own political and socia l practices. Said warns us to 
be crit ica l of these representations - of both Islamists, and reli gio us minoriti es alike 
in these regions, as they are often not correlative to reality. 
For Noam Chomsky, lingui st and veteran foreign policy commentator, the problem 
lies not only in successive U.S. governments acts of blatant self-interest, support of 
rogue states, and the iIJegal occupation of Israel in the Middle East (1999 :vii), but 
also in the inability of the U.S. media to report these events in any accou ntable, 
standardised and representative manner. Chomsky protests how "Israel has been 
granted a unique immunity from criti cism in mainstream journal ism and scho larship" 
in the U.S., that is not present even in Israel itself, and demands a balanced and fair 
representation of the situation on the ground. (2002 : 10-16) 
For both Said and Chomsky, the largest threat in the modern world is not the ri se of 
lslamic fu ndamenta li sm, but rather the appropriation of the ultimate mora l standard 
by the U.S. The discriminatory acts carried out by the govemment in the name of 
justice, while refusi ng to accept a reso lution backed by the United ations that 
requires the U.S. to operate with international law and fl outing it at every turn , are 
unacceptable. The Islamic Middle East is but one area where thi s attitude creates 
resentment and po liti cal complications. 
D: Islamic Moderate View 
The voices of Middle Eastern and Muslim scholars are rarely heard in the American 
media or in the international debate on Islamic militancy and the propensity of so-
caIJed Islamic extrem ist groups to vio lence. However, there are Muslim academics 
who are argu ing fo r a range of approaches towards understanding Islam that are 
united in their desi re to use detai led interpretations of the Q ' uran as guides to 
creating tolerant and respectful communities where Muslims and others can live side 
by side. The Islamic Moderate view encompasses a ca IJ to treat the Q ' uran as an 
open tex t, to re-eva luate the Q ' uranic concepts that separate the world into the places 
where Muslims may and may not res ide and to validate and establi sh soc ieties that 
are govellled by Is lamic precepts without being negative ly judged by those with 
alternati ve views. 
Khaled Abou El Fadi , a law professor at UCLA, is at the forefront of proposing a 
chaIJenge to Wahhabi Pu ri tanism in the form of a more refollllist, moderate Is lam 
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that is based in open interpretation of the Q' uran . Wahhabism is an Islamic refonn 
movement, originating in Arabia that was founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahab 
(c. 1703- 1 79 1), who taught that all accretions to Islam after the 3rd century. of the 
Muslim era- i.e., after c.950- were spurious and must be expunged. "(Wahabism 
is)essentiall y a purification ofSunni Islam". (Columbia Encyclopaedia, 2000) 
In oppos ition to Wahabism, EI Fadi argues that the Q' uran must be read keeping 
hi stori city and textuality in mind (2001). The desire to re-interpret Islamic tex ts in 
light of tbe ex igencies of modem life characterise the "open text" argument ofl slam. 
EI Fadi is supported in his argument by fellow scholar Amina Wadud, a professor of 
Islamic studies at Virginia Commonwealth University, who states that Islamic 
scriptures, like all religious texts, provide "poss ibilities for meaning, not 
inevitabilities" (2001, Wadud, 2001). Thus, Muslim scholars have a responsibility to 
create interpretive communities around Q'uranic texts that speak to the complex ities 
and vari ations in modem Islamic practice and politics, while remaining true to the 
overall moral message of the Q'uran. 
The Moderate Islamic view encompasses movements to create Islamic spaces in 
traditionall y non-Muslim countries. In a recent Time International article on Islam in 
France, author Nicholas Le Quesne notes the ri se of "Euro-Islam" (Time, 200 I). Le 
Quense speaks of many practising Muslims who feel that it is poss ible to be minority 
members of secular societies and still practice their faith with integrity. Interpretation 
of the Q' uran becomes more of a personal matter, and the sharia (Divine Law) can 
be interp reted as precepts to be followed in spirit rather than in practice. Adopting 
this stance on their faith requires some degree of assimilation into the society in 
which these Muslims reside. They value traditionally "Western" values of seculari sm 
and the rule of civi l law free from religious iniluence, and seek to create a space for 
Islam within it, rather than the other way around. 
However, there are those for whom Islam is less of a personal matter than a soc ietal 
one and who see this as a different but equally va lid forn1 of governance that 
Western nations must respect. The Ayatollah Mahdi Hadavi , a Shi-ite Muslim 
scholar in France, asks that the West not be ignorant or di smissive in their 
understanding of Islam as a religion and political entity (Nightline, 2002). He 
stresses that people in the West, who choose to judge Muslim cultures using thei r 
own notions of what is ri ght, misunderstand many aspects of Islam. He argues that 
Islamic sex ual morality, a Muslim 's personal relationship with God, the hijab 
(women's head dress), etc cannot be judged according to dominantly Protestant 
values, but must be understood within the context of Islamic precepts and the manner 
in which they are being practiced in various societies. He notes that understanding 
can only be reached if the West recognises that many Muslim countries have 
different, theologicall y based morals and values that cannot be understood in a 
Western secular context and may not be conducive to Western forn1s of government. 
The imposition of Western values and systems of government would be morally 
absolutist, imperialistic and regressive. Hadavi stresses the need for cultures to 
understand each other and respect the tenets that guide each society. 
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E: "Fundamentalist" Islamic View 
The availability of academic literature on the views of puritanical or extremist 
Muslims is at best limited and erratic. These groups vary geographical location as 
well as ideology - running the gamut from literal interpretat ions o f the Q ' uran to 
anti-imperialist, anti -U.S. rhetoric with a reli gious underpinning. While it is diffi cult 
to summarise the major gri evances of militant groups that range from the Jihad 
organisations to Al Qai 'da, some of these are di scussed below. Since September 11 , 
200 I, much media attention has been focused on Osama Bin Laden and hi s loose 
affiliation of terrorist cell s/grou ps, AI Qai'da. In thi s section, 1 wi ll use supporting 
indictments and comments from Osama Bin Laden and other ' Islamist' leaders. 
It is important to reali se that while the rhetoric of these groups is articu lated in 
Islamic tenTIs, in many cases the goa ls of these gro ups are based on speci fi c 
geographical and political grievances, as opposed to an overarching Is lamic 
ideology. The politica l ideology of an organi sation relates to their views regarding 
structures and methods of govenU11 ent, policy and law. In many nations, Islam is 
often the idiom for expressing di ssent with cu rrent governments and political 
systems that have failed to deliver on their promises of poverty alleviation and 
greater socio-economic equality. 
Politica l groups use religion to their advantage because of its large mobili sing 
potential, drawing legi timacy from their interpretations of Islamic texts (Majid, 
2000: 29). The demise of Leflist Sociali st movements in many Middle East nations 
has changed the landscape of political conflict in these nations. Scholars note that the 
primary lure of fu ndamentali sm li es not in its religious ideology, but rather its 
promise to ri ght the wrongs of the fa il ed secular past (Esposito, 1998). The potent 
combination of ineffectual governance and a national potential to be mobili sed with 
religious fervour provide an ideal base for increased support for Muslim revivali sm, 
in its vio lent and non-violent forms. 
One of the major grievances of fundamentali st groups against the United States is its 
self-serving and invas ive military presence in Saudi Arab ia after the Gu lf War. There 
is resentment and ire at the presence of " infide ls" (non-Mus lims) in the land o f two 
of Islam 's holi est cit ies, Mecca and Media. According to some groups, it amounts to 
a "crusade" against Is lam that is taking place at its very heart. In a 1998 interview, 
Osama Bin Laden notes that "The ca ll to wage war against America was made 
because America has spear headed the crusade against the Islamic nation, sending 
tens of thousands of its tTOOpS to the land o f the two Holy Mosques ... meddl ing in its 
affairs and politics, and its support of the comtpt, tyrannical regime that is in 
control" (www.pbs.org, 200 I). 
Another source of rage is the U.S.'s continued suppOtt and protection of Israel - at 
the cost of not only Palestinian soverei gnty, but also, according to some lslamists, 
Palestinians' dignity and humanity. Many all aro und the world, not only Muslims 
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and Islamists, see the Israeli occupation of Palestine as ethica lly wrong. Islami sts see 
the Palestinian fi ght for sovereignty as a justifi ed war against aggression and 
terrori sm. Osama Bin Laden sees thi s favouri ti sm on the part of the U.S. towards 
Israel as a parti cularly strong reason to be anti-U.S. He notes: "For over half a 
century, Muslims in Palestine have been slaughtered and assaulted and robbed of 
thei r honor and of their property" (www.pbs.org, 200 I). The instigator of these 
actions is Israel, with the military support of the U.S. (The U.S. is the largest 
expolter of arms and military equipment to Israel). Many Islamists, including Bin 
Laden, reproach the U.S. for supporting the illegal (according to the Geneva 
Convention) acts of the Israelis. 
The U.S. led embargo on Iraq that has resulted in the deaths o f over half a million 
Iraqi s, yet has not achieved any polit ical goal, is another source of ire for many 
[slamists. The U.S. government is seen as immoral, se lf-serving and ethica ll y corrupt 
fo r espousing the idea ls of freedom and democracy while imposing these inhumane 
sanctions. This is seen as yet another injustice against Muslims, along with the U.S. 
mi litary occupation in Somal ia, and lack of support and intervention from the U.S. 
aga inst the ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Ln retali ation for these and a multitude of other gri evances, such as the so-ca ll ed 
immorali ty of Ameri cans, some militant Islamists fee l that it is justifi ed to use 
vio lent means of protest against the U.S. These are what the U.S. , many other 
Western nations and many Muslims around the world would call terrorism. 
However, many militant Islamist groups see it di fferently. The acts of the U.S. 
govenunent are also often seen as not only anti-Islamic, but anti-God (Allah). Many 
see vio lent ls lami sm as an act of God (EI Fadl , 2001). Yusufa l Qaradwi, Director of 
the influential Sunni Research Centre in Qatar, has stated that Muslims "refuse 
terrori sm, but don' t consider it terrori sm to defend one's own home," (Feder, 200 
1:40). Osama Bin Laden, defending suicide bombings and attacks against U.S. 
targets has stated: "The terrorism we practi ce is of a commendable kind for it is 
directed at the tyrants and aggressors and the enemies of Allah". (www.pbs.org, 
200 1). Sheik Muhammad Sayyed Tantawi , a re ligious leader in Egypt's Sunni 
community claims: "taking one's life in the process of killing one's enemies of Islam 
isn' t suicide but ' self-defence and a kind of martyrdom'" (Feder, 2001 :40), Thus, 
terrori sm is not seen as terrori sm, but as a fi ght against injusti ce. 
Mili tant groups as populist movements are believed to be borne out of the frustration 
with despotic, corrupt governments and interventionist foreign powers. However, 
these frustrations are soon shrouded in puri tanical theological ideologies, and are 
expressed through "symbolic acts of power", and tend to be vio lent and ex tremi st (EI 
FadI, 200 I) . 
In summation, the gri evances of the militant Islanlist are mainly geo-politica l: the 
U.S . mil itary presence in the holy lands of Saudi Arabia, their anti-Palestinian, pro-
Israel stance, sanctions against Iraq that are debilitating the nation' s infrastructure 
and people, self-serving policy stances in many other Muslim nations and support for 
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the " un-Islamic" Saud regime in Saudi Arabia. However, some of the ir objections 
are also based on perceptions of the U.S. as an immoral , anti- Is lamic nation that 
needs to be opposed. 
The Ideal Types presented above allow us to look for di screte trends in the med ia 
presentation o[]slam. By looking at the views presented in the New York Times and 
Washington Times coverage on Is lam, as well as the manner of presentation , 
conc lusions may be drawn as to the type o f representation Islam is subject to. The 
Ideal Type allows us to extrapolate from the spec i fi c iti es of article content to the 
larger themes of vo ice within the public sphere. If there is an equitable presence of 
all the Ideal Types within the media, then there is trul y a full vari ety of information 
from which the public can draw their conclusions. However, if there is a prevalence 
of one over the other, then the reader is onl y getting one or few sides of a multi-
faceted picture. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
Hypothesising that there ex ists a prevalent anti-Islamic bias in the media, thi s 
analysis coded artic le content in 180 articles from two Northeastern U.S. papers, the 
New York Times and the Washington Times. I chose these two papers because they 
have distinct ideological positions and structural locati ons. Printing "All the News 
That's Fit to Print," The ew York Times bears the reputation of being the United 
States' unoffi cial newspaper of record. The New York Times is a moderately liberal 
paper, and one of the most innuen tial in the nation, not only for its e ffect on public 
op inion, but also due to its reputation for journali stic integrity and in-depth coverage 
of news (Gitlin, 1980: 299). The New York Times has an "extensive readership 
among the politica lly influenti al" and pract ica ll y operates as the house organ for the 
political elite (Gitlin, 1980:299). This is the newspaper that, above all others, "sets 
agendas, generat ing and certi fying issues in government, busi ness, intellectual, 
professional and academic c irc les in the country" (Gitlin , 1980: 299). Thus, the New 
York Times is an ex tremely important barometer of the issues and events that are 
considered newsworthy, and would be indicati ve of the manner in which these issues 
are being di scussed within certai n innuential ci rcles in thi s country. 
The Washington Ti mes is a conservative paper c lose to Capitol Hill , with a relatively 
small subscribership of 105,000 (www.web. lexis-nex is.com). The paper's editorial s 
genera ll y favour a more militari sti c and conservati ve forei gn policy, and contrast 
well with the apparent liberali sm of the New York Times. 
This anal ysis selects di screte events during the time span 1979-200 I that have been 
linked by the media to Islam and Islamic ex tremism by the media, and have ana lysed 
articles from the year of those events. It uses 15 articles per year for each sample 
year per newspaper. The sample years are: 1980, 1983, 1990, 1993, 1998, 2000 and 
200 I . For the Washington Times my sample begins with the year 1990, as the paper 
is arch ived online beginning from 1989. While noting that the di fference in sample 
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years may lead to inconsistencies in the results analysed, this paper attempts to keep 
these errors to a minimum. For each of the event years chosen, both newspapers 
were searched for articles with "Islam" in the headline or the lead paragraph. From 
the articles that fell into this category, every 3rd article was chosen until there were 
15 per newspaper. These were then coded for the variables listed in Appendix A. 
IV. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The content analysis will look for patterns of media bias in representations of Islam, 
and use events that have generated substantial media coverage about Islam and 
Islamic extremism. During media "events" to which Islamic fundamentali sts are 
allegedly linked, the number of articles in both the New York Times and the 
Washington Times with "Is lam" in the headline rises significantly. For example, a 
search for artic les with the word "Islam" in the headline and lead paragraph in the 
New York Times in 1982 (a year with no high profile media event linked to Islamic 
extremism) produced only 79 articles, while a search for the same type of articles in 
2001 (the year of 911 I) produced 740. A brief historical background of the events in 
this sample follows. 
The Iranian Hostage Crisis: (1979-1980) 
The events following the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran by a group of 
students on November 4, 1979 have consequently been labell ed "The Iranian 
Hostage Crisis". Approximately 500 students stormed the Embassy, and took 90 
people hostage. These hostages were held for various periods of time, with 52 
remaining in captivity for the full duration of 444 days. On January 20, 198 1, the 
U.S. released almost $8 billion in Iranian assets and the hostages were freed. This act 
of protest towards the United States came about as the result of long fermenting 
grievances against the U.S. involvement in Iranian domestic politics (Said, 1997:56) 
and its support of the ruler Muhammad Reza Shah Pallavi's "White Revolution" that 
sought to forcibl y Westernise, secularise and "modernise" Iran. The Central 
Intelligence Agency's (CIA) role in a coup overthrowing Mohammed Musadeq who 
had been elected in the 1953 elections began to sour relations between the two 
nations (Demeter, 1995 :94). The U.S supported the Shah's policies, which resulted 
in the unequal distribution of oil wealth, and the isolation of the grassroots 
popUlation from age-old traditions and cultural practices (Columbia Encyclopaedia, 
2001). By the early 1970s, there was much di scontent among not only the general 
public, but also the nation 's religious clergy, the ulama. In response to thi s unrest, 
the Shah's policies became repressive. The CIA trained secret police (SAVAK) were 
brutal in suppress ing any di ssent in the nation (Demeter, 1995 :94). Thousands of 
protesters had been imprisoned and/or executed. In 1978, violent protests broke out 
nation-wide in support of the exi led leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeni . By 1979, 
the Shah had fl ed the nation. Khomeni returned and took control of the nation. The 
Shah was admitted into the United States for medical treatment in 1979. This is the 
final event that led to the embassy seizure. 
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Thi s event marks the begilll1ing of "Islamic fundamentalism" entering U. S. publ ic 
media di scourse in a maj or way, and it is during reporting of and around thi s event 
that many o f the parameters for d iscourse on Is lam in relati on to the West were set. 
While reporting the events in iran, the media described the religiously based political 
views of the current Iran ian regime as "Islamic fundamenta lism", "religious 
rad ical ism", "extremism" etc as a way o f inva lidating claims to legitimate gri evances 
that the Irani an protesters might have had against successive United States 
governments (Said, 1997:57). The coverage of thi s event highlights the U.S medi a's 
process o f "omi ssion" rather than "comm iss ion" in reporting events related to events 
in the Midd le East i.e. the vital in fo nnation the publi c needs to understand the 
context of the conflict is denied to them. An example of such infonnation is the 
Shah's abuse of human rights, the CIA 's invo lvement in the 1953 coup or 
infornlati on regarding SA V AK. (Said, 1997 : 91) 
U.S Marin e Barrack Bombing, Lebanon (1983) 
By 1975, Lebanon was caught in the grips of a deadl y civil war between its 
Christian , Muslim and Palestini an populations. A cease-fi re was dec lared in October 
1976, but proved ineffecti ve. Israel brie fl y occupied South Lebanon in 1978 in 
retali ati on for attacks by the Palestine Li beration Organ isation (PLO). With the 
install ation of 6,000 United Nations peacekeeping troops, Israe l wi thdrew. In April 
1983, a truck bomb ki ll ed 260 U.S. Marines in their barracks at Beirut, as well as 60 
French so ldiers (Columbia Encyclopaedia, 200 I). This event led to an internati onal 
outcry and suspicion centred again on Islamic ex tremists. The loca l guerrill a 
movement Hizbo llah (Party of God) has gained huge journali stic attent ion in the 
U.S. media for protesting the Israe li occupied "security zone" in South Lebanon 
(Said, 1997: 13). 
T he Gulf War (1990- \ 99\ ) 
The Gul f War offic iall y began on August 2, 1990 and ended on March 3 1, 1991 with 
Iraq accepting a cease- fire. The conflicts that had led to Iraq 's annexation o f Kuwait 
had been long contested. Iraq had long considered Kuwai t to be a part of it s territory 
and c laimed that Ku wait was il legally tapping into its oi l well s on the border of the 
two nati ons (Columbia Encyclopaedia, 200 I). On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded 
Kuwait. After many U.S. threats o f sancti ons and demands fo r withd rawal, Iraq 
refused to comply, and the United Nations coalition led by the U.S . launched 
Operat ion Desert Stonn. This was a massive air war (beginn ing Jan uary 16, 1991 ) 
designed to destroy Iraqi mi litary and ci vil in frastructure. The main coa li tio n fo rces 
invaded Kuwait and Southern Iraq on February 24, 199 1 and a cease- fi re was signed 
on March 3 1, 1991. The onslaught ended wi th as many as 100,000 Iraq i deaths, 5 
million people displaced and over $200 bil lion in property damage (Hooglund, 
1991 :107). 
The Gulf War has been seen as a great tri umph for the first Bush admi nistration and 
16 ESS Workillg Paper 03 
Islalll in American Media (1980-200/) 
the U. S. However, Kell er argues that it "was a brilliantl y managed public relations 
event" and a "spectacle constructed for the media to prove the superi ority of U.S 
weapons , to establish the U. S as the number one super cop in the world ... , to gain 
control of the fl ow of oil" (Keller, 1995: I 05). Artz and Pollock argue that the U.S 
media reduced "a complex geopolitical situation to the moti ves of Saddam Hussein" 
( 1995: 120). They argue that the media's symbolic aggress ion towards Saddam 
Husse in by reviving o ld cari catures of Arabs and Muslims prepared the nation for the 
actual aggress ion of the unconditional demands President Bush placed on Iraq 
( 1995 : 12 1). 
World Trade Centre Bombing (1993) 
In October 1993, a group of militants attacked the World Trade Centre (WTC) in 
New York City with a massive car bomb. The resulting explosion kill ed 6 people and 
caused more than $300 million in damages (Columbia Encyclopaedia, 200 I). 
Suspicion immediately fell on the AIQai'da group of insurgents led by Osama Bin 
Laden. In 1995, Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman ("The Blind Sheik") and nine other 
terrori sts were convicted of conspiracy and other bombing-related charges. In 1998 
the mastermind behind the bomb, Razmi Youssef was arrested and is now in jail , as 
is Sheik Rahman (Newsweek, Sept 24, 200 1 :420). This event created a spate of 
arti cles expressing the ri sing concern over the threat of Is lamic terrori sm on U.S. 
so il. 
U.S Embassy Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania (1998) 
On August 7, 1998 a truck bomb destroyed the U. S. Embassy in the Kenyan capital 
Nairobi . Moments later another truck bomb exploded at the U. S. Embassy in Dar-Es-
Salaam, Tanzania. The bombings killed 21 3 in Nairobi and II in Dar-Es-Salaam 
(www.crm .com). The ensuing investigation by tbe U. S. government led them to 
Osama Bin Laden who by this time was hiding in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. A 
Federal Grand Ju ry indicted 22 men with crimes related to the bombings. In 
response, the U.S. government launched crui se missiles on an alleged terrori sm-
training complex in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical fac tory in Sudan on August 
20, 1998. Seri ous doubts have been raised about whether the pharmaceuti cal 
company was invo lved in producing biological weapons or not and the U.S. has 
faced criticism for its precipitous action in thi s regard (www.cnn.com). 
USS Cole Bombing, 2000 
Terrori sts attacked the USS Cole, a Navy destroyer moored at the port of Aden, 
Yemen on October 12,2000. The attack blew a 40-foot by 40-foo t gash in the side of 
the ship. Seventeen sailors and 39 others were killed in the blast. The ensuing 
investigation placed responsibility for the attacks with members of the AI Qai'da 
group. 
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World Trade Centre Attack, 200 1 
On September II, 200 I two hijacked Boeing 767s slammed into Tower I and 2 of 
the WTC. As a res ult, both the towers collapsed due to fire damage from the burning 
fuel. On the same day, two other Boeing 757s were hjjacked. One crashed into the 
mil itary headquarters at the Pentagon, and another crashed near Pittsburgh. The 
death to ll of the attacks has been estimated at 266 airline victims, over 5,000 workers 
and visitors at the WTC, 125 at the Pentagon and approximately 300 rescue, po li ce 
and fire fi ghters (Newsweek, Sept 24, 200 1:47). 
A group of 19 men led by Mohammed Atta have been identi fi ed as the culprits. They 
have being linked to Osama Bin Laden 's network of ex tremi st cell s, AI Qai 'da . The 
U.S. media has labelled them as "evil geniuses", "zealots" and " madmen" 
(Newsweek, Sept 24, 200 I : 45) . The swi fl retali atory actions of the U.S . by bombing 
Afghanistan have also received great support in the mai nstream media (Newsweek, 
October 1,2001: 28). This retaliation is made more acceptable to the public by the 
demonisation of the Taliban movement and anti-U.S. guerrillas worldwide. 
V.RESULTS 
[n general, this paper hypothesised that the New York Times (N YT) wo uld be more 
liberal in its reporti ng of the two papers surveyed, i.e. more likely to speak about 
lslamism in a more contextualised and balanced way. On the other hand , the 
Washington Times (WT) wo uld be conservative in its reporting, and appear 
derogatory towards a religion and culture that was far enough removed from 
conservati ve US politica l va lues to be somewhat incomprehensible. The fonner 
wo uld be more likely to report through a Moderate/Cultural lens, that while still 
reporting from a U.S. viewpoint. The NYT would try and place Islam and Muslim 
societies in a cu lturally relativist structural location . The hypothesis held that WT, as 
a newspaper that espouses Conservative values including a more iso lationi st and 
mi litary-based foreign policy, would fra me their reporting through a Clash of 
Civi li zati ons lens. 
When looking at the head line themes o f the arti cles, it was expected that the majority 
of them wo uld fall in to the category of Islamic political/religious extremism for both 
papers. This proved to be the case, as 62.2% of the overall sample arti cles headlines 
fell into thi s category. There did not seem to be any di scernable di fference in the 
headline coverage between the two papers. 
Article location also plays an important role in creating readers' perceptions of an 
issue ' s imp0l1ance and va lidity. The null hypothesis ex isted that the articl es wou ld 
mai nl y be in the in ternational section , followed by the front page and that there 
wou ld not be very significant differences between papers on thi s variable. The two 
different locati ons serve two very d ifferent purposes that are both integra l to shaping 
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the public view of an issue or group, in thi s case Islam and Muslims. A story's 
presence on the front page denotes that it is important and newsworthy. If Islamic 
fundamentali st stories regularl y tum up on front page, then it sends the message to 
the publ ic that events related to Islam are important. However, by putting articles 
about Islam in the International section, the paper distances and obj ecti fies the 
subject. It can be viewed as far away and unimportant, somehow di vorced from the 
rea lities of everyday life for most Ameri cans. By putting articles regarding Islam on 
the Editori al page the newspaper sends the message that analysis of the news 
regarding Islam is more important than factuall y reporting it. 
Contrary to the hypothes is, the data showed some surpri sing trends. Even though the 
overall sample' s data - 50.6% in the International News section, fo llowed by 18.3% 
fo r the Front Page and 13.9% in Editori al and Commentary sections seemed to 
support the initial thesis, the differences between newspapers were interesting. The 
NYT had a larger percentage (62.9%) in the International section, a similar 
percentage to the overall sample on the Front Page, and dec idedly fewer articles 
(6.7%) in the Edi to ri al section. The WT on the other hand had only 33 .33% in the 
international section and 18.7% on the Front Page, while an unusuall y high 24% of 
all arti c les were in the Editori al and Commentary section. 
When looking at regional coverage patterns over the years, it seems there is an 
absence of arti cles in the tota l sample of arti cles focusing on Centra l Asia until the 
rule of the Taliban. Media coverage does not merely identi fy a specific region as one 
where there is activity related to a parti cular issue, but often links the region with the 
reported acti vi ty in a causal way. This was the case with the M iddle East. Within the 
articles that focused on the Middle East, Over 90% of the arti cles on the Middle East 
referred to Islamic fundamentali sm, wi th 12% focusing on fundamentali st acti vity as 
a key point. A further, 66.7% of articles about the M iddle East did not d isti nguish 
between Islamic extremists and other practicing Muslims, as compared to onl y 35% 
of arti cles about South Asia. The nature of reporting on Islam in the Middle East 
highlights the med ia's perhaps inadvertent decision to concentrate on a parti cular 
construct of the region's practi ce of Islam in a manner conducive to fo reign policies 
favouring U.S. interests. 
The overall data observed ac ross all seven events shows 47.8% of the art ic les 
reporting through a politica l frame and 31.7% reporting through a religious one. The 
inter-newspaper differences show important di stinctions between the way hegemonic 
idea ls are di sseminated. The NYT focuses on a politica l rather than religious frame 
of reporting (54.3% vs. 25 .7%). The reportage for the WT is more religious than 
poli tical (40%vs. 38%). 
The majority of artic les (66% of overall sample) portrayed Islam as the over arching 
ideology of the location and culture portrayed. The data shows that 66% of the 
overall sample cited a religious Is I amic outlook as the dominant cul tural outlook fo r 
the region or individuals portrayed. Thus, the belief is perpetuated that Islam is a 
religion that is linked to all aspects of life in a nationlculture and dominates li fe in 
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regions where it is practiced, and that cultural life in these regions is characteri sed 
only by reli gion . 
The majority of surveyed 31iic les constructs a picture of Islam as traditi onal and 
unable to meet the demands of modern ity (45% for the entire sample, with no 
significant differences between the two sources), or conflicted (36.7% for overall 
sample). The view of Islam as tradit ional has been more or less constant over the 
years, but representing it as conflicted is a recent development, primarily s ince 1990. 
This could be due to the Islamic resurgence in some Islamic nations that has been 
often reported as fundamenta list activity. The WT is more likely than the NYT to 
characteri ze Islam as tradit ional w ithout di stingu ishing modalities of practi ce while 
The NYT is as li ke ly to consider Is lam as confli cted, as it is traditional (41.9% and 
41 % respecti vely). 
The resu lts show pervasive patterns of skewed representati on regarding Islamic 
movements - their characteristic, ori gins, means of attai ning goals and ideo logies. 
Over 82% of the arti c les in the overall sample referred to Islamic fundamentalism , 
and for 53 .9% it was a major foc us of the article. These percentages remained 
constant across both papers. Over half of the articles in the sampl e did not 
differentiate between Islamic Reviva li sm/Resurgence as a soc io-political movement, 
and funda mentalism or radical Islamic fr inge groups 
The data also supports a view projecting strong link between Islam and violence, 
with approximately 74% of articles linking Islam to violence in the overall sample 
and across both newspapers, further painting a negative picture. This vio lence is 
thought to be mainly linked wi th religious movements (approximately 35% in the 
overall sample, as well as the NYT and the WT individually) and are thought to be 
religious ly moti vated (41 % in the overall sample) . However, WT has a tendency to 
view more acts as reli giously motivated than the NYT (48% vs. 36%), as opposed to 
political ly motivated (20% in WT vs. 3 1 % in NYT) or soc ial protest acts (2.7% in 
WT vs. 4.8% in NYT). 
Islamic fundam entalists (including reviva li sts) are presented in such a manner as to 
diminish their legit imacy as protesters agai nst unjust poli cies and corrupt 
governments, but while unquestioning ly accepting the threat they present. They are 
regarded as devious in 25.9% and irrational in 58 .5% of all articles. 
In most artic les, Islamic movements are denied voice, and information on their goa ls 
and beliefs is imp3lied through Western spokespeople, who put forward their own 
ideologicall y biased beli efs as to the source and nature of these movements. In the 
overall sample, 50.6% of art icles had 1-5 anti-Islamic quotes and only 35% had pro-
Islamic quotes. 14.4% of articles in the sample had 6- 10 anti-Islamic quotes vs . 2% 
of pro-Is lamic quotes of the same number. The presence of quotes from both sides 
gives the appearance of a balanced story, however, as Detmer notes, " there is 
nothing magical about the number two" (1995:99) and a careful look must be taken 
at the proportion of quotes as well as their con tent. In the NYT and WI , the overall 
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picture is of a biased slant against Islam, with an article often hav ing onl y I or 2 
quotes from an Islam ic source, and 4-6 fro m an anti-Islamic SO llrce. These arti cles 
also fa il to rea li se that there are more than two sides to a story, and accordingly fa il 
to capture the moral ambiguiti es that are common in any of movement or confli ct. 
32.2% of the articl e sample fell into the Clash of Cultures category, while 17% of the 
sample articles represented major spokespeople espousing an Islamic Moderate View 
and 3.3% represented the Mili tant Islamic View. There was a 2 1.1 % representation 
of the Moderate Cultural view. The WT espoused the Clash of Cultures view in 
42.7% of its articles whi le 24.8% of the surveyed articles in NYT supported the 
view. The NYT also presented the Moderate/Cultural view in a substanti al number of 
cases, (20%) demonstrating a willingness to accommodate different viewpoints. 
Where in the interests o f objecti ve journalism and presenting a complete story there 
are Islamic spokespersons quoted, they are overwhelmingly Middle Eastern (56.6%). 
This trend remained constant across both papers, with the majority of arti cles in both 
papers (62 .7% in the NYT and 51 % in the WI) citing a Middle Eastern spokesman. 
The newspapers do not represent the wide vari ety of opinion within the Islamic 
world by only quoting Middle Eastern sources. Most_spokesP9rsons who are 
quoted are contextuali sed with political background (32.8% of the overall sample), 
and with no other biographical informati on. 27% of articles do not quote a 
spokesperson at all. 
The most pervasive patterns in the NYT's and WT's coverage of Islam is the 
enduring presence of the "Four Big Myths": Islam as anti -Western, anti-democrati c, 
anti-women and prone to extremism. The data shows that in an addi tive analysis, 
over 53.3%, 75.9%, 84.7% and 29.2% of all cases coded portrayed Islam as anti-
democratic, anti-Western, prone to extremism and anti-women respecti vely, 
demonstrat ing the pervasiveness of such views across di fferent political ideo logies 
and values within the U.S. media. 
Over 59% of the articles in the overall sample, 61 % in the NYT and 57.3% in the 
WT were unsympathetic to Islam, with the Islamic worl d presented as a monolithic 
block, free fro m di fferences in cultural and religious practice, where civi l life is most 
influenced by religiously moti vated politics, and not the general concerns of socio-
cultural status, economics and civil debate. The Clash of Civi li zation view is 
entrenched in the media surveyed, with 39.4% of overall coverage subscribing to the 
Ideal Type. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
There are pervasive patterns ill the results that point to the operation of underl ying 
processes of hegemony within the media. These patterns emerge in three major 
areas: trends within the identifying traits of the articles (headline, location etc), !11 
how Islam as a reli gion is presented and in how Islamic Revivali sm is presented. 
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There was a large preponderance of articl es with a head line refelTing to ex tremist 
Islamic activity. This could be due the media 's propensity to report "bad news," 
meaning that issues relating to extremist or militant activ ity would get more 
coverage as compared to general interest stories regarding Islam . Also, instability in 
the Muslim world (especia ll y in the Middle East) has been a major foreign policy 
concern for the U.S. si nce the fal l of communi sm and the break-up of the Soviet 
Un ion and thus news to that effect wou ld be more likely to be repol1ed here. 
Another exp lanation might be that the U.S.'s large political (I srael) and commercial 
(oil) interests in the Middle East region , and the economic and political elites's 
desire to maintain certain regimes (the Saud family in Saudi Arabia, Hosni 
Mubarak 's government in Egypt), wou ld result in media coverage that necessarily 
paints a negative and unstable picture o f the region that would seem to necessitate 
stringent foreign policy measures on the behal f of the U. S. government. 
The differences in article location between the two newspapers, i.e. the WT's 
propensity to put a larger number o f articles on Islam in the Editoria l section, can be 
accounted for by the nature of the va lues that the two newspapers espouse. The 
NYT's reporting on Islam is reflective of its moderate va lue base. and the paper is 
mostly interested in presenting these articles in the format of "factual" news 
reporting. The WT's proc li vity to present " news" on Islam in the fOl1ll of opinion 
pieces cou ld be evidence of an attitude that underva lues news regarding socio-
political developments in Is lam ic nations, and is more interested American 
journali sts' subjective opin ions on the news. 
Moving onto how the media portrays Islam and Muslims, there is a definite trend 
towards a negative portrayal. However, there are interest ing differences between the 
two news sources analysed. The NYT is much less likely to have a reli gious 
reporting frame than the WT, even though both papers primari ly use the reli gious 
and poli ti ca l frame to report from. This could demonstrate that the moderate paper 
(NYT) is more invested in report ing news that is does not de fine Muslims onl y by 
their religion, but rather reports actual political events, while the more politically 
conservati ve paper beli ev ing Is lam itself to be a tlu·eat, could hypothesise that most 
events in the Islamic world are religious ly motivated , in keeping with the C lash of 
Civi li sati ons view. The public wo uld not on ly be presented a skewed picture of what 
is important about Islam and Islamic states, but wo uld also be left unawa re of the 
ex istence of other frames. A reductive approach towards Islam 's diversity of soc ial 
experience wou ld resu lt in iso lating the subjects from the readers, creating a feeling 
that Muslim are "different" in an undesirable way. 
There are fo ur enduring myths in the media 's portrayal of Islam :Islam as anti-
democratic, anti-women, anti -Western and prone to extremism. The myth o f Islam as 
anti-Western can be traced to Islam 's refusal to hold the same world view as the U.S. 
Islam has not gone through a great refolTl1ation in the manner o f Protestanti sm, the 
rel igion on which the moral tenets of the U.S. are based. This is seen as a 
shortcoming, not merely a di fference. Any religion that has not evo lved in the same 
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manner as Protestanti sm is open to accusations of anti-Westerni sm. Islam 's refusal to 
outward ly embrace (or at least in the Western interpretation) the tenets of secularism 
leave it open to the label of "backward", and make it particularl y unacceptable to 
Ameri cans. Many Islamic countri es, where religion, while informing a large part of 
public li fe , is still not the dri ving force in politics, are di smissed by US media as 
unsecular. Nations where there is a pronounced and constitutionall y enshrined place 
for religion are seen as backward and anti-democratic, because a hegemonic 
understanding of democracy leaves no place for religion. Any reli gion that prescribes 
a place for itself in the governance of a nation, as Islam does, is thought to be prone 
to extremism. A nation would need to adopt the U.S.'s approach to Church and State 
in order to be considered secular. Most Muslim nations do not fi t neatl y into the 
prescribed framework as there is a wide vari ety of religious practi ce in Islamic 
nations that runs the gamut from democratic to theocratic. The fai lure of the U.S. 
media to recogni se and accept this is based on the secular premise of reporting and 
scholarship. The premise of secularity renders Islam opaque to Western readers and 
increases its remoteness, all the while obfuscat ing the subject ivity that journali sts are 
bringing to their portrayal ofIslam. 
The view of Islam as anti-women is conspicuous by its absence in US media till the 
ri se of the Taliban. U.S. media interest in women's ri ghts in Islamic countries 
directl y co incided with their political interests in the Taliban as an oppos itional 
force. Suddenl y, large number of arti cles appeared chronic ling "Islam 's" 
mistreatment of women. However, it was spec ifica ll y the Taliban' s interpretation of 
Islam ic precepts that mandated their treatment of women. Yet, by link ing the Taliban 
to the extreme oppression of women, the media created a negati ve public opinion of 
Afghanistan. As a result, when U.S. foreign po li cy dictates necessitated the bombing 
of Afghanistan, the aggression was largely accepted as de fac to. Until the 
government made the Taliban a foreign policy priority, the ill-treatment of women in 
" Islamic" nations such as Saudi Arabia who is an economic all y and one of the 
U.S.'s largest suppliers of oil was not a medi a concern . This highlights the 
connection between the medi a and the interests of the dominating ideo logy. 
When covering Islamic revivali sm and fundamentali sm, the media skews its 
portrayal of both the fundamentali st revivali st movement as a whole (it' s hard to tell 
the terms apart as newspapers rarely make that di stinction) and the people invo lved 
in them. By and large, both newspapers do not bother to di ffe rentiate between 
Islamic Revivali sm and Fundamentali sm. The media ' s tendency to confuse a des ire 
to run a country by Islamic precepts and a desire to embrace fringe reli gious political 
ideology is in teresting. Perhaps it is the notion of threat that extremist Islam brings 
with it that leads the media to paint all Muslims as prone to extremist thinking. 
Another poss ibility is that attempts to use textual and religious authority as a 
legitimator on the part of many fundamentalist groups lead journali sts to view these 
movements as religious and not poli tical. Another explanation could be a simple 
aversion to the synthesis of a religion that sees its place as a guide fo r all areas of 
civil li fe, including the political and political organisations that use the legitimating 
power of religion to gain support. Noting the U.S . two party system that seeks to 
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draw legitimacy fro m authority vested in political ideology, it is poss ible that the 
idea of religious legitimacy can not have a place within the hegemonic discourse. 
Islamic revivali sts are characterized as devious, intolerant, irrational and violent. 
These are traits that America, at least per media representation , prides itself on not 
possessing. The American nation supposedl y struggles for the rul e of rational law 
and openness of soc ial life wh ile adopting an inclusionary po licy towards all. 
Whether or not this is true, the va lidity and des irability of these ideas is not up for 
question , and any group blatantly opposed to American va lues as they are portrayed 
is looked down upon. When applied to Is lam ists, trait labels are neither 
contextuali sed nor accurately defined . There is no public scrutiny of these labels 
because the public trusts the media to provide it wi th acc urate representations of the 
news. If these labels are applied repeatedl y, they become soc ial rea lity, servi ng the 
interests of those who create policy. Non-contex tuali zation slams the door on public 
debate. If " militants" were contextualised and their viewpoints heard , US jingoism 
would lose appeal. It would be harder to blatantly side with Israel if the Palest in ian 
side of the conflict was given due share in media . Islamists and Islam are denied 
complete presence in the media sphere. Truncated and mi srepresentati ve images 
result in the public viewing Islamic movements in any form with distaste and 
incomprehension. The process of hegemony is subtl e in operation, and leaves little 
evidence of the partia lity of its viewpoi nts. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Cul tural hegemony serves very selecti ve sections of the soc iety who benefit fro m the 
intellectual , moral and political authority that hegemonic domination gives them . In 
the U.S. , the govemmental and corporate elite are served by the perperuat ion of anti-
Islamic sentiment that allows them to maintain its st rategic support of Israel in order 
to appease the Jewish lobby, which is an in flu enti al force in American politics, and 
also to give the U.S, an al ly in a hi storically troubled region. A military presence in 
Saudi Arabia protects big business' large-sca le economic interests in oil. The 
perpetuation of negative stereotypes regarding Islam allows the U.S. to implement 
foreign policy that will not onl y appease political and corporate interests, but also 
maintain public support for these policies, as the public does not see them as 
negative ly impacting Muslims. lnstead, po li cies that are often viewed as offensive 
and interventionist by Muslim nations are viewed as moral and j ust by large sections 
of the U.S. public, e.g. the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia is seen as 
problematic by many in the region, but is represented by the media as a welcomed 
and well-regarded policy. 
Within the media, the C lass of Civi li zati ons view perpetuates hegemonic domination 
by disseminating a stance that is supporti ve of the ruling class. The presence of the 
ModeratelLiberal view reveals some va ri at ions within the operati on of thi s 
hegemony, but overall does not have a substantial effect on providing an 
oppositional voice in public di scourse. Unli ke the Gramscian model however, there 
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are intell ectuals who are acti vely participating in a counter-hegemonic movement to 
oppose the complete domination of hegemonic idea ls. Counter-hegemonic 
viewpoints are marginalized to the fringes of media and academia, circul ating wi thin 
small inte llectual circ les, available onl y through non-mainstream sources and 
magazines. On the other hand, media and academic work support hegemonic 
ideo logies are not onl y available in the mainstream, but also cannoni sed in the fo rm 
of foreign policy that is directl y influenced by it. 
The CUltural_hegemony at work here departs from the classical Gramscian model in 
the fact that it is ideals about others (i.e. Muslims and Islamists) that the uninfornled 
public is internal ising, not about other members in their own soc iety. However, the 
hegemonic ideas have large repercuss ions in garnering the Ameri can public's 
support for foreign poli cies that are punitive towards Muslims. This support is an 
indirect result o f internali sing the media 's di ssemination of certain ideas; regarding 
islam and Muslims. These foreign policies might have long-ternl detrimental effects 
fo r Muslim peoples and governments who are powerless to shape how they are to be 
represented. However,_unlike classical hegemonic models, Muslims and Islamists 
are not internali sing these. negati ve representations of themselves, hav ing their own 
soc ial, cultural , ethnic, political and religious identiti es. 
This current cultural hegemony works in a far more complex manner than Gramscian 
capitali st economic hegemony. It is based on presenting a narrow, di storted view of 
Islam while appearing to represent the full breadth of opinion. The public is 
presented with media coverage that relegates news about Islam to the International 
News section, representing Islam as a tradition and faith far removed fTom American 
life. The hegemonic view of Islam is perpetuated primaril y by mi srepresenting the 
nature of Islam itself, and also by inaccurately reporting on po li tica l changes in 
Islamic nations, spec ifically the Middle East. Islamic Reviva li st movements are 
robbed of their context and legitimacy by being presented as overly vio lent, irrati onal 
and dangerous. Both newspapers studied are likely to label is lamists negati vely 
without properly contextual ising their gri evances or the source of their ex tremist 
views. In a large number of cases, these groups are trying to create po litical change 
within their own governments and/or protesting U.S. initi ated interventionism. The 
reader, however, is not made aware of thi s, and the Islamists' causes are inva lidated 
and de-legitimised. ls lamists are seen as provocative and dangerous, and it becomes 
incumbent on the U. S. to reassert moral order. If all the sides of the story are not 
reported, the information from which to draw conclusions immedi ately becomes 
much more limited. However, neither the public nor the medi a itse lf is aware that the 
news framework is less than complete. By presenting Islamic movements in a 
vacuum, the media pushes the discourse into the realm of moral absoluti st debate. 
This inability to comprehend the multi-faceted nature of Islam is due to the 
Ameri can public's internali sation of hegemonic values that dominate American li fe, 
such as the separation of Church and State, a democratic model of government, 
visible societal roles for women etc. Even though religion may playa large part in 
Ameri can governmental and politica l processes (note the Chri stian Coalition, the 
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Conservati ve Right), Americans ho ld fast to the national val ue that there is no place 
for religion in politics. Subsequentl y, not on ly is the communal and political 
ideology of Islam rendered unfamiliar, but it is also presented as inherently inferior 
by those who do not accept the synthesis of religious, cultural and political life in a 
manner that is completely foreign to the majority of Americans. There is an inability 
among many Americans to comprehend the economic or cultural desire for a soc iety-
wide religious reviva li st movement or a desire for a theocratic form of government. 
An arti ficial distance is created between the two worlds, with the Islamic world 
presented not as a co llection of disparate nati ons and cultures with specific and 
enduring traditions, but as a mono lithic block that is characteri sed so lely by its 
adherence to lsi am. 
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APPENDIX A: Coding Scheme 
I . In artic les about Islam, what is the head line theme? headline 
I . Muslim politicallreligious ex tremism 
2. Other 
3. Is lam General Interest 
4. Islam General Politica l 
2. What is the location of arti c le? location 
I . Front Page 
2. DomesticlNational Section 
3. International News section 
4. Commentary 
5. Life/ReligionlMetro 
3. What is the year of the article? (2000) year 
I. 1980 
2. 1983 
3. 1990 
4. 1993 
5. 1998 
6. 2000 
7. 200 1 
4. What region is highlighted in the article? regIOn 
1. Middle East-North Africa 
2. South Asia 
3. Central-East Asia 
4. Other 
5. Is Islam portrayed as dominant cultural outlook of the individualslregion 
highl ighted in the articl e? domcult 
I. Yes 
2. No 
3. Other 
6. If Islam is the dominant cultural outlook of the individuals/region, how is it 
portrayed? domculpo 
1. AhistoricallTradtional 
2. Modern/Changing 
3. Confli cted 
4. Other 
7. How could the reporting frame of the article be characteri sed? repfi·ame 
1. Socio-cultural 
2. Religious 
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3. Po litical 
4. Other 
8. Is Islam portrayed as: (Al l that apply) 
l. Anti- Western 
2. Anti -Women 
3. Prone to extremism 
4. Anti-democratic 
5. Other 
Is/alii in American Media (/980-200/) 
is lampor 
9. Is there direct reference to Islam ic Fundamentali sm/Reviva li sm? refi sfun 
l. Yes 
2. No 
10. If yes, what is its relative emphasis in the arti c le? relifemp 
I. Major 
2. Mi nor 
3. Other 
11.15 there a distinction made between Is lamic "Fundam entali sm" and 
"Revivalism"? disfure 
l. Yes 
2. No 
3. Other 
12. what are the alleged sources of extremist views? (All that apply) sourcfun 
I . Political Il1doctrinat ion 
2. Geographica l Proximity 
3. Etlmic Identity 
4. Deprivation (Political/Econom ic) 
5. Unclear or Unspeci fi ed 
13. Are negative ("ex tremist", "terrorist", " mil li tant" etc) or posItIve ("activ ist", 
"freedom fighter", "protester") app li ed to Islamic Fundamentali st/Reviva li st groups? 
neglabel 
I. NegativE 
2. Positive 
3. Other 
14. Is there a distinction made between those labelled Islamic "Fundamentali sts" and 
other practising Muslims? distfumu 
l. Yes 
2. No 
3. Other 
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15. What are the characteristics attributed to Islamic Fundamenta li stsfRevi vali sts? 
(A ll that apply) isfuncha 
1. Violent 
2. lntolerant 
3. Devious 
4. lrrational 
5. Other 
16. If an Islamic spokespersonfpoliticalleader is named in artic le, are they: ispokreg 
1. ArabiclMiddle Eastern 
2. American 
3. European 
4. Other 
17. If yes, how is he contextuali sed? Ispokcon 
1. EducationalfOccupational background 
2. Political background 
3. Ethnic background 
4. Famil yfRelationship background 
5. Other 
18. Does the article mention or emphasise link between Islam and vio lent act ions? 
isviolen 
1. Yes 
2. No 
19. If yes, what type of violence: typeviol 
I . State driven 
2. Political movement 
3. Religious movement 
4. Individual acts 
5. Other 
20. In artic les that report violent acts by Islamist groups, are these acts regarded as: 
lsvloreg 
1. Justified political acts 
2. Ex tremist religious acts 
3. Social protest acts 
4. Other 
21. Number of Pro-Islamist quotes in the arti cle: numproqu 
I . None 
2. 1-5 
3. 6-10 
4. 11 + 
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4. 11 + 
23. What is the overall slant of the artic le? al1slant 
I. Sympathet ic to Is lam 
2. Unsympathet ic to Is lam 
3. Balanced 
24. What is the ideo logica l s lant of the majority o f the spokespersons in the art ic le? 
ideiypoq 
I. Clash of C ivi lisati ons/ Conservati ve View 
2. Moderate/Cultura l View 
3. Anti-Imperia li st View 
4. Islamic Moderate View 
5. M ili tant Is lamic View 
6. Other 
25. What is the ideo logica l s lant of the article? ides lant 
1. C lash of Civili sati ons/ Conservative View 
2. Moderate/Cultural View 
3. Anti- Imperi ali st View 
4. Islamic Moderate View 
5. Mili tant Is lamic Vi ew 
6. Other 
There is a variab le that codes fo r what newspaper the arti cles are from. newspapr 
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